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SUMMARY 
 
Suspension as a form of an unfair labour practice can be of two categories.  There 
could be a situation where an employer suspends an employee as a disciplinary 
sanction after an employee has committed an act of misconduct.  This is often 
referred to as a punitive suspension.  An employer may also suspend an employee 
pending a disciplinary hearing.  In this case the employee has not yet been found 
guilty because the investigation into the alleged misconduct is still on going.  The 
employee may be suspended as a way of preventing him from interfering with the 
investigation process into the alleged misconduct.  This form of suspension is often 
referred to as a preventative suspension.  It is very important to note the distinction 
between the two forms of suspension because the processes that are followed when 
effecting them are different.  Failure to acknowledge the difference might result in a 
situation where an employer might be effecting a preventative suspension but the 
consequences might be that of a punitive suspension and end-up being an unfair 
labour practice.  Suspension is a disciplinary measure, and it is important to note that 
in the event that the employer elects to implement a suspension, its conduct must be 
disciplinary in nature and intent and should be corrective rather than punitive.  
 
Unlike dismissals where the Code of Good Practice of the Labour Relations Act, No 
66 of 1995 provides guidance on what constitutes procedural and substantive 
fairness, there are no guidelines on what constitutes procedural and substantive 
fairness when it comes to suspensions.  This has resulted in a situation where 
suspension is treated as a minor aspect of disciplinary measures that is frequently 
abused as it is often on full remuneration.  This, however, does not allow an 
employer to suspend employees at will, without merit and without following proper 
procedure.  Suspension could have severe adverse effects on employees and often 
affects their reputation, goodwill, human dignity, self-esteem and the right to 
meaningful association and work.  It is for this reason that suspension must be 
effected in a way that is procedurally and substantively fair. 
 
Punitive suspension is implemented as a sanction and is often without pay and is a 
last resort prior to dismissal.  Preventative suspension occurs prior to a disciplinary 
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hearing, with the aim of temporarily removing the employee from the workplace to 
enable the employer to conduct a proper investigation without interference.  
Unfortunately preventative suspensions are often abused by employers in that they 
protract over extended periods of time, making the preventative suspension punitive 
in nature, to the extent that the courts have been forced to intervene and lay down 
stringent requirements that must be met in order to prevent such abuse. 
 
There are various requirements for suspension which range from the intention of the 
employer, the audi alteram partem rule, sufficient reasons prior to suspension to 
period of suspension. 
 
Most employment relationships are governed by disciplinary codes or collective 
agreements, which often place limitations on the concept of suspension.  Some 
codes provide for special leave at the option of the employee, which the employer 
often abuses instead of utilizing the preventative suspension option.  This, however, 
is more often than not to suit a political agenda. 
 
In the event of non-compliance by an employer, an employee is not left remediless.  
An unfair suspension constitutes an unfair labour practice and an employee has the 
right to refer such dispute to the relevant labour forums like the CCMA or the relevant 
bargaining council.  Employees are cautioned not to refer their disputes to the Labour 
Court for final relief, but rather to only approach the courts for urgent interim relief, 
like interdicts. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The basis of the employment relationship is the contract of employment.  On the face 
of it, it can be argued that the employment contract is entered into voluntarily and on 
an equal basis by the parties to the contract.  However, in reality this is hardly ever 
the case.  The employer, due to the resources at his disposal, is in a stronger 
bargaining position than the employee who is desperate for an income.  Given that 
the employer reserves the right to discipline the employee for misconduct it is 
necessary that the possibility of the employer abusing disciplinary action is kept in 
check.  It is for this very reason that labour legislation intervenes in the relationship in 
order to ensure fairness. 
 
In the past the power play was exceptionally one-sided, leaning heavily towards the 
side of the employer, giving employers the monopoly to do whatever they please. 
This was allowed by the common law, which did not recognize the concept of 
fairness, but merely recognized a general duty of good faith.  The courts recognized 
the inequity in the employment relationship and started developing the common law 
to align it with the values which our Constitution holds.  The courts realized that a 
distinction has to be drawn between “lawfulness” and “fairness”.  Simply because 
disciplinary action is lawful, does not necessarily make it fair, however, unlawful 
disciplinary action is most certainly unfair. The court held that the ultimate 
determinant is therefore fairness, and not lawfulness.1   
 
Over the years, that monopoly of the employer has been severely limited by the 
various judgments, and labour legislations that have been introduced in South Africa 
with the aim of creating a balancing act between the rights of employers and the 
rights of employees.   
 
Without that tug of war between the rights of employers and employees, disciplinary 
measures would be futile, as employers will have the prerogative to institute 
discipline how and when they so choose.  However, with the introduction of the 
                                                          
1  NUMSA v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd & Others [1996] 6 BLLR 697 (A) at 460. 
2 
Labour Relations Act (“LRA”)2 any form of disciplinary action has to meet certain 
minimum requirements.  The LRA demands both substantive and procedural fairness 
in order to bring a form of equilibrium in the employment relationship.  
 
The focus of this script is suspension which is governed by section 186(2) of the 
LRA.  Section 186(2) gives effect to section 23 of the Constitution,3 which provides 
for the right to fair labour practices.  
 
Suspension is a two-dimensional aspect in our labour law that has created much 
animosity and upheaval.  There are two forms of suspension, one being preventative 
in nature and the other punitive.  Preventative suspension occurs when an employee 
is removed from the workplace on a suspicion that he or she has committed some 
form of misconduct, in order for the employer to conduct a formal investigation 
relating to the alleged charges.  Punitive suspension occurs where the employer has 
conducted the investigation, found sufficient grounds to proceed with a disciplinary 
hearing and the employee is found guilty.  The employer may then elect a sanction 
that is appropriate in the circumstances.  Punitive suspension could be such sanction 
but may only be applied in very extreme cases and only as a last resort prior to 
dismissal.  
 
It is worth noting that when dealing with preventative suspension the employee is not 
necessarily disadvantaged because it has to be on full remuneration.  The problem is 
that preventative suspension can easily be abused by the employer, often 
implemented in Provincial and Local Government to suit political agendas, often 
disguised under the ruse of “special leave”.  
 
The questions that arise are what the lawful requirements for both a preventative and 
punitive suspension as disciplinary measures are, and what the effect of collective 
agreements in Local and Provincial Governments is. 
 
                                                          
2  No 66 of 1995. 
3  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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The purpose of this treatise is to highlight some of the various problems that 
employees encounter, not only so in the private sector, but especially also in the 
public sector, focusing on the local municipality and the public service.  
 
Chapter 2 contains the general principle of what constitutes disciplinary action with 
the focus on the antagonistic relationship between the employer and the employee.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the difference between punitive and preventative suspension 
and also the lawful requirements of both forms of suspension.  Chapter 4 contains 
and highlights the problems that the public sector employees face with the abuse of 
preventative suspensions.  Chapter 5 sets out the relief in various forms in different 
forums that employees can or may consider when suspended unfairly and the 
requirements for each form of relief.  The discussion is concluded in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PURPOSE OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In order to understand the concept of suspension, especially where and how it fits 
into the employment relationship, it is of utmost importance to fully grasp the 
underlying concept of the antagonistic employment relationship, where the power 
occurred, how the law has influenced that power, and where the power lies today. 
 
2.2 THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
 
In the past, the concept of an employment relationship was extremely one-sided, 
placing all the power in the court of the employer.  This type of relationship is best 
described by Otto Kahn:4 
 
“…the relation between an employer and an isolated employee is typically 
between a bearer of power and one who is not a bearer of power. In its 
inception it is an act of submission, in its operation it is a condition of 
subordination, however much the submission and the subordination may be 
concealed by the indispensable figment of the legal mind known as the 
‘contract of employment’. The main object of labour law has always been, 
and … will always be a countervailing force to counteract the inequality of 
the bargaining power which is inherent in the employment relationship.” 
 
Under the common law the employer has always had the right to discipline an 
employee in whatsoever manner it desired and it was always the employer’s 
unfettered prerogative to determine the severity of the sanction.  This role of power 
was often abused to the detriment of the employee.  However, with the introduction 
of the Labour Relations Act (“the LRA”)5 this one-side power has been levelled to a 
certain extent by the introduction of the element of fairness into the employment 
relationship, aimed at creating a level playing field for employers and employees. 
 
                                                          
4  Labour and the Law Hamlyn Lectures (1972) 7. 
5  66 of 1995. 
5 
Even with the introduction of these labour laws, the employment relationship 
continues to be somewhat antagonistic.  Employers and employees still attempt to 
meet each other in the middle, but in reality, each party has its own needs and will do 
whatever it takes to have those needs fulfilled.  The employer has the need for 
productivity and profit, and the employee has the need for job security and an 
income.  
 
Each party’s respective needs to add to the antagonism of the employment 
relationship and creates a gap of indifference.  The Code of Good Practice (“the 
Code”)6 has been created in an attempt to close this gap of indifference and reach 
some form of middle ground in protecting both the rights of the employer and the 
employee.  Even though the Code is in relation to dismissals, it does provide for 
disciplinary action prior to dismissal, as set out in clause 3 thereof.  
 
In relation to disciplinary action prior to dismissal, the Code provides the following:7 
 
“The key principle in this Code is that employers and employees should 
treat one another with mutual respect. A premium is placed on both 
employment justice and the efficient operation of business. While 
employees should be protected from arbitrary action, employers are entitled 
to satisfactory conduct and work performance from their employees.” 
 
The Code provides that all employers should aim to adopt a disciplinary code.  The 
benefit of a disciplinary code is that the employee is fully aware of what is expected 
of him, and in the event that this expectation is defaulted on, the employer is fully 
aware of what action it can take against the employee to rectify the employee’s 
behaviour.  
 
The rules created by an employer must create a level of certainty and unambiguity. 
Employees must be made fully aware of the employer’s rules and regulations in a 
manner that is simple to understand.  For those employees who are illiterate, the 
rules and regulations must be explained.  It is accepted, however, that some minor 
rules of the employer are so well established and common sense in a way, that it is 
                                                          
6  Schedule 8: Code of Good Practice Dismissal. 
7  Item 1(3) of the Code. 
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not necessary to communicate them to the employees.  The employer must be 
consistent in the way it implements its disciplinary action against employees.8 
 
In the event that the employee steps out of line, or contravenes the employer’s 
disciplinary code, the employer should proceed to take disciplinary action against the 
employee with the aim of correcting the employee’s behaviour.9  This corrective 
approach is clear from the wording in clause 3.2 of the Code, which provides as 
follows:  
 
“The courts have endorsed the concept of corrective or progressive 
discipline. This approach regards the purpose of discipline as a means for 
employees to know and understand what standards are required of them. 
Efforts should be made to correct employees' behaviour through a system 
of graduated disciplinary measures such as counselling and warnings.” 
 
The conduct of an employer is only disciplinary action if such conduct is disciplinary 
both in nature and intent on part of the employer and is regarded as corrective, rather 
than punitive.10 
 
When it comes to dismissing employees, the LRA makes a distinction between the 
procedures to be followed and the reason for the dismissal. In order for a dismissal to 
pass muster, it has to be both procedurally and substantively fair.11  
 
In order to comply with any form of disciplinary action procedurally, there has to be 
an investigation, written charges and a hearing.  The employee must be given 
sufficient notice to prepare for the hearing, and at the hearing the employee must be 
given a fair opportunity to present his or her defence and cross-examine any witness 
the employer presents.  The rules of audi alteram partem and natural justice 
therefore need to be complied with.12  
 
                                                          
8  Item 3(1) of the Code. 
9  Grogan Employment Rights (2010) 135. 
10  Ibid  
11  Grogan Employment Rights 136. 
12  The Code, clause 4(1). 
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Substantively, there has to be fair reason for the sanction to be imposed.  Fair reason 
will include whether the employee transgressed a rule, whether the employee was 
aware of the rule and whether the rule is reasonable.13  
 
An employer has various sanctions at his disposal depending on the seriousness of 
the offence which ranges from as minor as a warning, demotion, suspension and 
even as severe as dismissal.  Whether or not the reason is serious enough to 
warrant the sanction imposed will depend on the nature of the employer’s disciplinary 
code.14 
 
2.3 CONCLUSION 
 
Now that there is a proper understanding of the concept of disciplinary action, and 
the responsibility and power to enforce sanctions, the focus of this dissertation is on 
the effects of suspension as a form of disciplinary action which will be discussed in 
Chapter 3.  
  
                                                          
13  The Code, clause 6. 
14  Grogan Employment Rights 136. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SUSPENSION 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Suspension is used commonly in the employment context.  However, in order to 
understand its application and consequences it is important to understand exactly 
what suspension is and what it entails.  In this chapter, the focus will be on what 
suspension entails, especially looking at the different types of suspension and the 
consequences that they have for the employee and employer.   
 
This chapter will also focus on the general requirements for a fair suspension and the 
consequences should any of the requirements not be met. 
 
3.2 WHAT IS SUSPENSION? 
 
The term “suspension” is used in labour law to describe a particular happening in 
which an employer temporarily refuses to accept the services of an employee, yet the 
employer does not terminate the employment relationship.15 
 
In the event of suspension, the employee is not rendering services, yet there is a 
positive duty on the employer to pay the employee the usual wage or remuneration 
package as per the common law contract of employment.  It is only when the 
employer and employee have contracted, either by means of the original employment 
contract or by entering into a collective agreement which provides that the employer 
is not obliged to pay the employee the ordinary remuneration package in the case of 
suspension.16  In the absence of an agreement between the parties, the employee 
will likely succeed in proving breach of contract by the employer should the 
remuneration be unilaterally withheld. 
 
                                                          
15  Grogan Employment Rights 130. 
16  131. 
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In certain circumstances, the employee will be able to prove that the suspension is 
unfair as it adversely affects the right of that employee to remuneration or the 
employee’s right to professional development.17  
 
The agreement entered into between the employer and the employee will determine 
whether the employee has the right to work.18  The express words of the contract will 
be able to reveal the right, together with the type of employment and the amount and 
payment structure of the remuneration to which the employee is entitled to.19 
Examples where suspension affects the employee’s right to work are where the 
status of an employee is affected and such status is crucial to the employee, where 
an employee is paid by commission, or where suspension would affect the ability of 
the employee to maintain or build up a certain level of expertise.20 
 
The two kinds of suspension, preventative, and punitive will be discussed in detail in 
this chapter. 
 
Employees are protected against the unfairness of suspension as any unfairness 
constitutes an unfair labour practice.  This is entrenched in legislation by section 
186(2) of the LRA which provides as follows:  
 
“Unfair labour practice means any unfair act or omission that arises 
between an employer and an employee involving - 
 
(b) the unfair suspension of an employee or any other unfair disciplinary 
action short of dismissal in respect of an employee.” 
 
By including conduct relating to suspension as part of this section it is clear that the 
legislature recognized that in certain circumstances suspension may be fair.21  It is 
also clear that this section can be divided into separate parts, the one being 
“suspension”, and the other “any other disciplinary action”.22 
 
                                                          
17  Van der Walt & Biggs “Aspects of unfair suspension at work” 2011 Obiter 697 697 – 711. 
18  699. 
19  Marbe v George Edwards Daly’s Theatre (1928) 1 KB 269 at 288. 
20  Van der Walt & Biggs 2011 Obiter 698  697 – 711. 
21  Van der Walt & Biggs 2011 Obiter 700 697 – 711. 
22  Grogan Employment Rights 131. 
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This reference to “any other disciplinary action” gives an indication that the legislature 
intended only dismissal to be a disciplinary sanction and not all the other forms 
available to employers in labour law currently.23 
 
The courts have accepted in Koka v Director-General: Provincial Administration, 
North West Government24 that this provision in the LRA provides not only for punitive 
suspensions, but for preventative suspension as well.  This view has subsequently 
also been imposed by the CCMA and Bargaining Councils are accepting jurisdiction 
in both these regards. 
 
3.3 PUNITIVE SUSPENSION 
 
Punitive suspension is a form of disciplinary action and is in effect a sanction short of 
dismissal.25  This form of suspension is given to an employee after a process of an 
investigation and a hearing, and the employer has elected suspension as a 
consequence of the employee’s misconduct, as a sanction after a finding of guilt. 
 
As suspension without pay is a very harsh sanction to impose, often with severe 
possible consequences for the employee, it is advised that this type of sanction be 
imposed with great caution.  However, despite the severity of the consequences, it is 
still acceptable as an alternative to dismissal.26  
 
As this sanction is a sanction short of dismissal, the nature of the sanction indicates 
that the trust relationship between the employer and the employee has not broken 
down irretrievably and a continued relationship is not unbearable / as opposed to that 
of dismissal, where the employment relationship has broken down to such a state of 
disrepair that it cannot be fathomed that the parties can work together again in the 
future. 
 
                                                          
23  131. 
24  (1997) 18 ILJ 1018 (LC) 23 - 24. 
25  142. 
26  Leshomo & Another v Clover SA (Pty) Ltd (2011) JOL 27967 (CCMA) 116. 
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Despite the severity of this sanction, one has to take into account the employment 
rate in South Africa and the struggles that individuals face in having to find 
employment.  It cannot reasonably be expected of an employer merely to give a 
warning to an employee who is guilty of grave misconduct, or perhaps an employee 
who repeats a form of misconduct without feeling remorse knowing that he will simply 
receive a warning.  Economically, it does not affect the employee at all and there is 
no motivation to rectify its conduct.  However, where the sanction of suspension 
without pay is implemented, the employee is punished to the extent that he can feel 
the punishment in his purse strings.  It allows the employer to discipline its employee 
for grave misconduct, but it still treasures the employment relationship for the good of 
both parties involved. 
 
This type of suspension is generally only implemented on occasions where the 
employment contract, disciplinary code, collective agreement or legislation allows for 
it.  
 
3.4 REQUIREMENTS FOR A FAIR PUNITIVE SUSPENSION 
 
It is often unfair to allow an employer the sanction of unpaid suspension when it is 
not provided for in the employer’s disciplinary code.  However, this absence does not 
bar an employer outright from relying on this type of sanction.  
 
In the case of County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd, punitive suspension was found to be 
permissible even though not specifically provided for in the employer’s disciplinary 
code.27  The court had this to say:28  
 
“The offer of suspension without pay is an extension of mercy. It is a 
merciful sanction because it avoids the harsh consequences associated 
with dismissal. Mercy, it has been said, is an indispensable attribute of 
justice.” 
 
This principle was re-affirmed in South African Breweries Ltd (Bear Division) v 
Woolfrey & Others,29 where the Court held:  
                                                          
27  County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others [1998] 6 BLLR 557 (LC) 589C-D. 
28  Par 21-G. 
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“The imposition of suspension without pay as a disciplinary penalty is 
because the employee has committed some form of a disciplinary breach. 
An employer is entitled to take action against employees who misconduct 
themselves. Once the employer has decided that instead of terminating the 
contract of employment it will simply suspend it for a period it is not acting 
unlawfully.” 
 
However, punitive suspension must still be implemented only in accordance with fair 
reason and fair procedure.30 
 
“For fair reason” refers to the substantive requirement for a fair punitive suspension, 
and requires that the employee must be guilty of the misconduct accused of, and the 
misconduct so proved must have been of a very serious nature.  It would be safe to 
suggest that this type of sanction is imposed only as a last resort prior to dismissal. 
Similar factors which are considered for the sanction of dismissal should be 
considered for this sanction.  These factors are set out in Item 3(5) of the Code:31  
 
“… [t]he employer should in addition to the gravity of the misconduct 
consider factors such as the employee’s circumstances (including length of 
service, previous disciplinary record and personal circumstances), the 
nature of the job in the circumstances and the infringement itself.” 
 
Section 2(1)(c) of the Schedule 7 of the LRA,32 is also applicable in this instance. It is 
understandable that this Act is silent on all disciplinary sanctions save for that of 
dismissal; however, the word that is conspicuous in this particular section is 
“unfair”.33  As the Act does not provide for any precise rules to determine fairness for 
any disciplinary action short of dismissal, the general principles relating to the 
sanction of dismissal in this Act will have to be applied in its general sense just as 
was done with the Code of Good Practice Dismissal. 
 
These requirements can be summarized as follows: 
 
a) The employer must have proved the misconduct: 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
29  [1995] 5 BLLR 525 (LC) at par 12. 
30  Leshomo & another v Clover SA (Pty) Ltd supra 117. 
31  LRA, Schedule 8: Code of Good Practice Dismissal. 
32  Recently amended. 
33   Grogan “Suspended Animations” 1998 (May) Employment Law Journal. 
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Once the employer suspects the misconduct of the employee, it is important 
for the employer to lodge an investigation into the alleged misconduct and 
confirm with sufficient certainty that the employee actually committed the 
alleged offence.  It is not sufficient for the employer to suspend an employee 
on a mere allegation or assumption of alleged misconduct.  
 
b) The employee must have been aware that the misconduct was a breach of a 
disciplinary standard: 
 
In the event that the employer, through its investigation finds that the 
employee had breached a workplace rule or policy, it has to be established 
whether the rule actually existed, whether it was actively being used and 
enforced in the workplace, and also whether the employee was aware, or 
should reasonably have been aware of this rule.  
 
There are numerous occasions in which a workplace rule or policy has 
become disused due to the passage of time, alternatively becomes non-
applicable due to the change in the workplace.  Further, there is no point in 
an employer having a workplace rule or policy but this rule is only known by 
top management or the rule has never been communicated to the 
employees. In such a circumstance the employee would not be aware of the 
rule.  However, certain rules are so clear and based on common sense that it 
is not required of the employer to communicate such rule, for instance, that 
employees may not steal, or employees may not assault once another in the 
workplace.  
 
c) The suspension must be the appropriate sanction: 
 
In the light of the nature of the misconduct, it has to be established that 
suspension without pay was the appropriate sanction to impose taking into 
consideration the various circumstances and factors set out in the LRA 
mentioned above.  
 
14 
If the misconduct complained of is of such a minor nature and insignificant, 
the employer should resort to a lesser form of sanction like a written warning 
instead of suspension without pay. 
 
d) The penalty of punitive suspension must have been consistently applied in 
the workplace: 
 
In order for the punitive suspension to be fair, the employer has an obligation 
to impose sanctions consistently.  Therefore, other employees who have 
committed similar acts of misconduct must also have been punished with a 
similar sanction.  
 
It is understandable that every matter is different and the circumstances are 
unique.  This would influence the sanction to be imposed.  However, the 
employer should as far as reasonably possible treat like cases alike, and 
award similar sanctions respectively.  
 
e) Hearing: 
 
Suspension as a disciplinary sanction is imposed as a penalty short of 
dismissal and it would be detrimental to the employer to not follow fair 
procedure.  As guidance, it would be advisable for all employers to consult 
the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal.34 
 
“Normally, the employer should conduct an investigation to determine 
whether there are grounds for dismissal. This does not need to be a 
formal enquiry. The employer should notify the employee of the 
allegations using a form and language that the employee can 
reasonably understand. The employee should be allowed the 
opportunity to state a case in response to the allegations. The 
employee should be entitled to a reasonable time to prepare the 
response and to the assistance of a trade union representative or 
fellow employee. After the enquiry, the employer should communicate 
the decision taken, and preferably furnish the employee with written 
notification of that decision.” 
 
                                                          
34  LRA, Schedule 8: Clause 4(1) of the Code of Good Practice Dismissal. 
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In order to impose a penalty, there had to be an investigation to determine 
whether the employee was actually guilty of the misconduct as alleged.  The 
employee should then be given a reasonable opportunity to make 
representations both before the finding of guilty, as well as after such finding 
in order to give mitigating circumstances relating to sanction. 
 
Should the employer fail to comply with just one of the above requirements, it 
is at risk of being taken to the CCMA or relevant Bargaining Council for 
conduct relating to an unfair labour practice.  
 
3.5 PREVENTATIVE SUSPENSION 
 
Preventative suspension (otherwise known as a precautionary suspension) occurs 
where disciplinary charges are being investigated against an employee, and the 
employee is then suspended pending the investigation and the outcome of the 
disciplinary hearing.  
 
This form of suspension is only reasonable should it be anticipated that the employee 
will interfere with the employer’s investigation of the alleged misconduct, and commit 
the offence again,35 or in the event that the employee will intimidate witnesses who 
are to assist in the investigation or testify at the disciplinary hearing.  In these 
circumstances it then becomes necessary to remove the employee temporarily from 
the workplace.36 
 
In the case of Mogothle v Premier of the Northwest Province & Others37 Van Niekerk 
J referred to Halton Cheadle’s publication in which the following was observed:38 
 
“[s]uspension is the employment equivalent of arrest, with the consequence 
that an employee suffers palpable prejudice to reputation, advancement 
and fulfilment.” 
 
                                                          
35  Cheadle “Revisiting the LRA and the BCEA” Working paper 06/109 (DPRU UCT June 2006). 
36  Basson et al Essential Labour Law (2005) 193. 
37  (2009) JOL 22987 (LC). 
38  Cheadle Regulated Flexibility and Small Business: Revisiting the LRA and the BCEA (2006) 27 
ILJ 663 par 71. 
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Van Niekerk J’s interpretation of this requirement is that suspension should not be 
taken lightly, alternatively should not be resorted to too hastily.  According to 
Cheadle, there is only one reasonable motive for suspension, and that is the 
apprehension that the employee will interfere with the investigation, intimidate 
witnesses, or repeat the misconduct in question. 
 
The underlying principle for the concept of preventative suspension was accurately 
captured by Jaybhay AJ, as the “maintenance of the integrity and morale of the 
employer requires action to be taken”.  His view can further be summarized as a 
necessary measure which is aimed at promoting orderly administration in the 
employer’s workplace which is necessary to be implemented without delay, both for 
the benefit of the employer and the employee subject to the requirements mentioned 
below.39 
 
Jaybhay AJ went further and noted that the object which underlies the speedy 
investigation, without unreasonable delay, is to prevent the unnecessary disruption in 
the life of the employee, to minimize the anxiety and concern of the employee, to limit 
the possibility that the employee will not be allowed a fair hearing, and to resolve the 
dispute expeditiously.40  
 
The courts have confirmed the above principle in the English Court of Appeal in the 
matter of Lewis v Heffer & Others41 in which the following was held:  
 
“Very often irregularities are disclosed in a government department or in a 
business house; and a man may be suspended on full pay, pending 
enquiries. Suspicion may rest on him; and so he is suspended until he is 
cleared of it. No one, so far as I know, has ever questioned such a 
suspension on the ground that it could not be done, unless he is given 
notice of the charge and an opportunity of defending himself, and so forth. 
The suspension in such a case is merely done by way of good 
administration. A situation has arisen in which something must be done at 
once. The work of the department or office is being affected by rumours 
and suspicions. The others will not trust the man. In order to get back to 
proper work, the man is suspended.” 
 
                                                          
39  Mabilo v Mpumalanga Provincial Government & Others [1999] 8 BLLR 821 (LC) par 17. 
40  Par 18. 
41  1978 (3) ALL ER 354 (CA). 
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It is imperative for the employer to ensure that this type of suspension is not punitive, 
as the allegation of misconduct has not yet been proved by the employer, as this is 
occurring prior to the disciplinary hearing.42  Preventative suspension has to be on 
full pay, unless the employer is contractually entitled to suspend the employee 
without pay.  An instance where unpaid preventative suspensions are allowed is in 
the South African Police Service, where preventative suspensions are without 
remuneration by authority of their regulations.  In such circumstances, the duty on 
the employer is even more onerous to finalize its suspension speedily and institute 
disciplinary action as a matter of urgency.  In any other sector, preventative 
suspension without pay in anticipation of a disciplinary enquiry is unfair.43  It is further 
unlawful for the employer to withdraw the allowances to which the employee would 
generally be entitled to during the ordinary course of the employment relationship.44 
 
3.6 REQUIREMENTS FOR A FAIR PREVENTATIVE SUSPENSION 
 
Every case of suspension will have to be decided on its own merits. Despite 
preventative suspension not being a sanction, it still has to be both procedurally and 
substantively fair.  The starting point would be to consider the purpose of a 
preventative suspension.  
 
The purpose of a pre-suspension hearing must be confined to establishing whether 
suspension is warranted, and on what terms.45  In the matter of Gradwell,46 the 
Labour Appeal Court pointed out the following: “procedural fairness depends in each 
case on the weighing and balancing of a range of factors including the nature of the 
decision, the rights, interests and expectations affected by it, the circumstances in 
which it is made, and the consequences resulting from it”.  Therefore, the standard of 
procedural fairness may be “legitimately attenuated”. 
 
                                                          
42  Van Niekerk, Christianson, McGregor, Smit and van Eck Law @ Work (2008) 183. 
43  Tsaperas v Clayville Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd (2002) BALR 1225 (CCMA). 
44  Joubert v Ground Crew (Pty) Ltd t/a First Catering SA (2009) 12 BALR 1284 (CCMA). 
45  Grogan “In suspense: Fresh thoughts on suspension” 2012 Employment Law Journal 
46  Member of the Executive Council for Education, North West Provincial Government v Gradwell 
[2012] 8 BLLR 747 (LAC). 
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There are various factors which have bearing on the fairness of a particular 
suspension.  
 
a) The intention of the employer: 
 
The intention of the employer could be deduced from its motive.  The 
employer’s motive will determine whether the suspension was implemented 
for its intended purpose.  In the matter of Sajid v Mahomed NO & Others47 it 
was found that the employer’s motive was not honourable.  The employee 
was the Imam and Khatib of the Grey Street Mosque, in Durban.  He was 
effectively suspended on 24 October 1997.48  A disciplinary enquiry was 
eventually convened on 29 January 1998, until December 1998 during which 
time the disciplinary enquiry sat occasionally from time to time during which 
the respondent amended and added charges against the applicant.49 
 
At the Labour Court, on review of the Commissioner’s award, Judge Zondo 
pointed out that the employer failed to put any evidence before it that the 
employer had taken a decision to proceed with an enquiry which it effectively 
withdrew, and the only inference to be drawn from that conduct would be that 
it was never the employer’s intention in the first place to convene any form of 
inquiry into whether or not the employee was incompatible as it was initially 
alleged.50  The result being that the suspension was actually seen as punitive 
and not preventative which made it substantially unfair.51 
 
Furthermore, there must also be an objectively justifiable reason to deny the 
employee access to the workplace, for instance the employee has access to 
information necessary for the investigation and there is a possibility that the 
employee could destroy such information.52 
 
                                                          
47  (1999) JOL 5076 (LC). 
48  At pg 6 par 10.  
49  At pg 8 par 12. 
50  Pg 31 par 71. 
51  Grogan Employment Rights 132. 
52  Member of the Executive Council for Education, North West Provincial Government v Gradwell 
supra. 
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b) The employer has to give reasons:  
 
It is imperative for the employee to be given the details of his alleged 
misconduct, as well as the reasons for his intended suspension.  In the 
recent matter of Lebu (1),53 the court confirmed that it was not sufficient for 
an employer to rely on a mere suspicion that the employee who had 
committed the alleged misconduct.  That would not be sufficient and not hold 
water and would definitely not justify a preventative suspension.  The court 
correctly held that, where an employer did not provide the employee with 
written reason prior to his suspension the employer was committing breach of 
contract.54  In Lebu (2) the court went further and noted that the “purpose” of 
removing an employee from the workplace, even temporarily and on full pay, 
had to be rational and reasonable, and had to be conveyed to the employee 
concerned with adequate particulars to enable the employee to compile 
sufficient detail to enable him/her to assemble the representations that he or 
she has been invited to make in an explicit way.55  This process of 
reasonableness cannot be rectified after the fact.  This is discussed further in 
(d) below. 
 
c) Prima facie case: 
 
The employer must have established a prima facie case against the 
employee in order for any suspension to be fair.  If the employer is unable to 
prove a prima facie case there is no reasonable basis for keeping the 
employee from fulfilling his duties.56 
 
A prima facie case would be established when the employer realizes that the 
employee did in fact commit some form of misconduct, and that, objectively 
speaking, there is a valid and sound reason to keep the employee away from 
                                                          
53  Lebu v Maquassi Hills Local Municipality (1) (2012) 33 ILJ 642 (LC). 
54  Cohen “Precautionary Suspension in the public sector: Member of the Executive Council for 
Education, North West Provincial Government v Gradwell (2012) 33 ILJ 2033 (LC)” (2013) ILJ 
34, 1706 – 1714 1707.  
55  Lebu v Maquassi Hills Local Municipality (2) (2012) 33 ILJ 653 (LC). 
56  Marcus v Minister of Correctional Services & Others (2005) 26 ILJ 745 (SE). 
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the workplace.57  It has to be kept in mind that this is not punitive as it is 
envisaging a hearing pending a disciplinary enquiry and the misconduct has 
not yet been proved.58 
 
d) Audi alteram partem principle: 
 
This has been a very intriguing topic in the courts in South Africa over the last 
few years, which has resulted in various conflicting judgments.  These 
conflicting judgments ranged from employees not having a right to be 
heard,59 to having a right to be heard but that right is implied from the 
employment contract itself; alternatively that the right stems from 
administrative law in terms of section 158(1)(a).60  
 
It has been argued that a hearing prior to suspension amounts to duplication, 
as the whole purpose of preventative suspension is to allow an investigation 
into the seriousness of the alleged misconduct of the employee and allow the 
employer to prepare for a disciplinary hearing.  However, the courts have 
held that an employee is entitled to be heard before being suspended.61 
 
The reason for this is due to the fact that the Labour Court has recognized 
that suspension has a detrimental impact on an employee’s reputation, 
advancement, job security and fulfilment.  The effects of suspension will be 
discussed later on this chapter. 
 
However, our courts have seemed all to get into one trend when considering 
an employee’s right to be heard. Molahlehi J opined as follows:62 
 
                                                          
57  Grogan Dismissal Discrimination & Unfair Labour Practices (2005) 241. 
58  Van der Walt & Biggs 2011 Obiter 701 697 – 711. 
59  Justisie and Swart & others v Minister of Education & Culture, House of Representatives & 
another 1986 (3) SA 331 (C). 
60  Member of the Executive Council for Education, North West Provincial Government v Gradwell 
supra. 
61  Muller v Chairman, Minister’s Council, House of Representatives (1991) 12 ILJ 761 (C). 
62  SAPO Ltd v Jansen van Vuuren NO and others [2008] 8 BLLR 798 (LC) par 37. 
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“There is, however, a need to send a message to employers that they 
should refrain from hastily resorting to suspending employees when 
there are no valid reasons to do so. Suspensions have a detrimental 
impact on the affected employee and may prejudice his or her 
reputation, advancement, job security and fulfilment. It is therefore 
necessary that suspensions are based on substantive reasons and 
fair procedures are followed prior to suspending an employee. In 
other words, unless circumstances dictate otherwise, the employer 
should offer an employee an opportunity to be heard before placing 
him or her on suspension."  
 
The judges of the Labour Appeal Court have followed this same route and 
have set the record straight relating to an employee’s right to a hearing prior 
to a precautionary suspension.  They confirmed that this right arose from a 
right located within the provisions of the LRA. That right being the duty on 
employers not to subject employees to unfair labour practices.  This right 
does therefore not arise from the Constitution, PAJA or as an implied term of 
the contract of employment as previously held by the Courts.63 
 
When an employee was given sufficient time to make representations as to 
why he or she should not be suspended, it is safe to say that the audi 
principle has been complied with.64  What constitutes a “reasonable time” to 
make representations has also been criticized by the courts.  In Biyase,65 the 
courts have determined that 7 days are a reasonable period.  This time frame 
was also confirmed in Lebu (2).66 
 
An employee should be notified of the suspension, the reasons for the 
suspension and the conditions of the suspension, as well as further be 
informed of details regarding payment, expectations from employee during 
period of suspension and duration of suspension.67 
 
 
 
                                                          
63  Member of the Executive Council for Education, North West Provincial Government v Gradwell 
supra par 45. 
64  Par 47. 
65  Biyase v Sisonke District Municipality& Others (2012) 33 ILJ 598 (LC).  
66  Norton “The requirements for a fair and lawful suspension” (2013) ILJ 1709. 
67  Van der Walt & Biggs 2011 Obiter 705 697 – 711. 
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e) The length of the period of suspension:  
 
A preventative suspension for an unreasonably long period of time 
constitutes an unfair labour practice.68  What is unreasonably long depends 
on the circumstances.  Some may argue that it depends on how long the 
employer requires to finish the investigation.  Generally speaking, 3 months 
appear to be reasonable, taking into consideration the time period provided 
for in most disciplinary codes. 
 
Therefore, it is safe to assume that the period of suspension has to be 
reasonable and an employee may not be kept on suspension for an indefinite 
period of time. It doesn’t matter whether the suspension is on full pay or 
not.69  
 
Whether the period of suspension is reasonable will depend on case to case. 
The period of suspension will even be more unfavourable to the employer 
should the employer fails to adhere to the time limits set out in its own 
disciplinary code of conduct.  The effect of non-compliance with disciplinary 
codes or collective agreements will be described more fully in chapter 4 
below. 
 
The courts have expressed that what can be accepted as “reasonable” for a 
period of suspension is the length an employer would need to conclude a 
proper investigation into the alleged misconduct of the employee, as the 
employee is entitled to a speedy and effective resolution of the dispute.70  
 
It can be submitted that any lengthy delay in finalizing the charges against 
the employee which results in an unreasonably extended suspension can be 
declared substantively unfair.71 
 
                                                          
68  Minister of Labour v General Public Service Sectoral Bargaining Council [2007] 5 BLLR 467 
(LC). 
69  Ngwenya v Premier of KwaZulu-Natal (2001) 22 ILJ 1667 (LC). 
70  Mabilo v Mpumalanga Provincial Government (1999) 20 ILJ 1818 (LC). 
71  Van der Walt & Biggs 2011 Obiter 704 697 – 711. 
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3.7 EFFECT OF SUSPENSIONS 
 
In an unreported case of Setlhoane & Others v Department of Education North West 
Province & Others72 the Labour Court stated that the prejudice that an employee may 
suffer as a result of suspension is not limited to financial loss.  One needs to consider 
the reason for the potential suspension, if there exists a suspicion of misconduct and 
various other aspects that materially affect the employee come into play, for instance 
the integrity and dignity of the employee. 
 
In another matter the Supreme Court of Appeal found that the affects of suspension 
on employees are massive.  For an employee, the crux is not productive work just as 
a key for survival but rather that taking part in productive work is a crucial part of a 
person’s human dignity as humans are social beings with the need of self-esteem 
and a sense of self-worth which is found by being accepted in society and being 
useful to others.73 
 
In SAPO Ltd v Jansen van Vuuren NO and Others,74 Molahlehi J, in addition to the 
sentiments expressed by some of his colleagues in earlier judgments, mentioned 
further aspects of suspension that affects the employee detrimentally and can be 
seen as the equivalent of an arrest.  These are factors, such as reputation, 
advancement, job security and fulfilment. 
 
It is important for employers to note that compensation that can be awarded to an 
employee is not limited to the 12-month ceiling stipulated in the LRA.  The Labour 
Appeal Court has looked beyond that, at what is just and equitable in the 
circumstances, and awarded an employee non-patrimonial loss as well as legal fees 
which the employee incurred to protect its rights.75 
 
Therefore, the effects of suspension on the employee are numerous and far-reaching 
in consequences and employers should heed caution before suspending employees 
                                                          
72  J2234/09 & J213/09 5/11/2009 (LC). 
73  Minister of Home Affairs v Watchenuka (2004) 1 All SA 21 (SCA) par 27. 
74  [2008] 8 BLLR 798 (LC). 
75  Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Another v Michael Malisa Thishonga 
(Case no: JA6/2007). 
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haphazardly.  Labour legislation like the LRA and BCEA has been enacted to protect 
employees in trying circumstances such as malicious suspensions, and employers 
could find themselves being forced to compensate employees rather than discipline 
them as initially intended. 
 
For the employer, especially in the instance of preventative suspension, it means the 
financial loss of remunerating the employee whilst at the same time not having the 
employee on site and benefitting from the services which such employee should be 
rendering.  This was emphasized in the Ngwenya v Premier of Kwazulu Natal,76 
where the court had this to declare: 
    
“An employee cannot remain on suspension, which is a precautionary 
suspension, for an indefinite period of time and the State gladly pays the 
employee for doing nothing when it does not have money to pay those 
performing their duties…The applicant has received full benefits for nine 
months for doing nothing.” 
 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
 
From the above discussion it is apparent that suspension, whether preventative or 
punitive in nature, has significant implications for the employee, and the employer 
has to consider the consequences stemming from the contract between them, as well 
as possible unfair labour-practice referrals based on section 186(2) of the LRA. 
 
Unless contractually agreed between the parties, an unpaid suspension will most 
definitely be breach of contract.  Therefore, preventative suspension should always 
be on full pay.  However, even paid suspension could be breach of contract if the 
employee has a contractual right to work.  
 
In the event of punitive suspension, the employee’s consent should be obtained, and 
if refused unreasonably, dismissal will have to be considered by the employer.  
 
For any suspension to be fair, it has to be substantively and procedurally fair.  
 
                                                          
76  [2001] 8 BLLR 924 (LC) par 42 and 43. 
25 
Substantive fairness focuses on the reason for the suspension.  For preventative 
suspension, the decision to suspend has to be reasonable taking into consideration 
the nature of the misconduct and the influence the presence of the employee will 
have during the investigation.  The reason cannot be a mere suspicion that the 
employee committed the alleged misconduct and has to be considered on a prima 
facie ground.  For punitive suspension, the decision to suspend also depends on the 
nature of the misconduct, the seriousness of the offence and should only be 
considered as a lesser sanction to that of dismissal. 
 
Procedural fairness largely turns around the right to be heard.  For punitive 
suspension it is a sanction and is only imposed after a disciplinary enquiry.  However, 
for preventative suspension, it is paramount that the employee be given an 
opportunity to make representations.  
 
Lastly, employers should be cautious when considering suspension in any form; it 
could constitute an attack on an employee’s dignity and employers could expose 
themselves to an unfavourable award or judgment in favour of the employee, 
possibly paying up to the 12-month remuneration, non-patrimonial compensation as 
well as legal fees.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE EFFECT OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS OR DISCIPLINARY 
CODES ON SUSPENSION AND DISCIPLINARY ACTION 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Some academic writers like Cheadle suggest that arbitrary suspensions and 
unreasonably extended periods of suspension could be cured by judicial scrutiny and 
a Code of Good Practice which provide a statutory obligation to conclude a 
disciplinary enquiry within a reasonable period of time.77  
 
A collective agreement is entered into between employers and employees, trade 
unions and employers’ organizations for the purposes of collective bargaining. 
Various industries’ Collective Agreements or Disciplinary Codes deal specifically with 
suspension of employees under certain circumstances, and provide for limitations on 
various aspects affecting the suspension of employees.  
 
These collective agreements dealing specifically with suspension are commonly 
found in various industries.  However, more often than not these collective 
agreements are not adhered to, specifically when it relates to the time limitations 
provided for suspension and further disciplinary action.  
 
The State as the largest employer in South Africa is the biggest culprit in this regard 
as employees regularly stand to endure unreasonably long suspensions pending 
disciplinary action (which are often backed by political agendas), in certain instances 
enduring for periods exceeding 2 years.  For the various reasons stated in the 
preceding chapters, such suspensions affect the rights of employees adversely.  
 
Alternatively, Government will place an employee on “special leave” which, for all 
intents and purposes, has been done subject to a politically driven motive and in any 
event, should have been a period of preventative suspension.  
 
                                                          
77  Cheadle “Regulated Flexibility: Revisiting the LRA and the BCEA” (2006) ILJ 663 par 74. 
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For the purposes of this chapter I shall be focussing on public servants and municipal 
employees and the respective disciplinary codes and procedures governing those 
sectors. 
 
4.2 THE LOCAL MUNICIPALITY 
 
This concept of Cheadle, as set out above, can be assumed, is exactly what the 
drafters had in mind when they drafted the South African Local Government 
Bargaining Council’s Disciplinary Procedure and Code Collective Agreement 
(“SALGBC Disciplinary Code”).78 
 
Paragraph 14 of this SALGBC Disciplinary Code deals specifically with the 
suspension of an employee pending a disciplinary hearing and provides as follows: 
 
“14.1  The Employer may suspend the Employee or utilise him temporarily 
in another capacity pending an investigation into alleged misconduct 
if the Municipal Manager or his authorized representative is of the 
opinion that it would be detrimental to the interest of the Employer if 
the Employee remains in active service. 
 
14.6 The suspension or utilization in another capacity of the Employee 
shall be for a fixed term and pre-determined period and shall not 
exceed a period of three months. 
 
14.7 Any suspension shall be on full remuneration.” 
 
The local municipalities have a bad reputation pertaining to complying with their own 
collective agreement, specifically in relation to instituting disciplinary action timeously 
and suspending employees for considerable periods at a time.  
 
The time period for the suspension ties in perfectly with the time limitation 
incorporated for instituting disciplinary action. 
 
Paragraph 6.3 of the SALGBC Disciplinary Code provides as follows:  
 
“The Employer shall proceed forthwith or as soon as reasonably possible 
with a Disciplinary Hearing but in any event not later than three (3) months 
                                                          
78  Concluded between the SALGBC, IMATU, and SAMWU and came into effect 1 July 2010. 
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from the date on which the Employer became aware of the alleged 
misconduct. Should the Employer fail to proceed within the period 
stipulated above and still wish to pursue the matter, it shall apply for 
condonation to the relevant division of the SALGBC.” 
 
The cases to site are numerous, however, I shall focus intently on the unreported 
matter of Roland Williams v the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality.79 For years 
municipalities have evaded responsibility stipulated in the Collective Agreement 
when it comes to the unlawful protracted suspensions of its employees by failing to 
comply with the time periods agreed, and were never brought to task about their 
conduct. In the majority of cases where there has been a complaint by employees 
regarding to unfair conduct of the municipality, municipalities rely on the argument of 
it being a large organisation with numerous departments and employees and as a 
result, they require more time to comply with the time constraints set out in its own 
disciplinary code and collective agreement. In the majority of cases, suspension goes 
hand in hand with an overdue disciplinary hearing. However, in the above matter of 
Williams, the Commissioner decided that substance should trump form and decided 
to intervene. 
 
As a brief background, Mr Williams, the employee, is the Chief Operating Officer, 
Communications Manager of the employer, the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality. 
During the 2010 Soccer World Cup the employee was involved with the erection of 
certain advertising gantries.  It is alleged by the employer that such gantries did not 
conform to building regulations and subsequent to their being erected, they had to be 
removed, with the employer facing possible lawsuits from the owners of such 
gantries for losses suffered.80  
 
The employee was suspended on 3 August 2012, more than two years after his 
alleged misconduct.  On 5 November 2012 the employee’s suspension was 
unilaterally extended by the employer “until further notice”.81  
 
                                                          
79  SALGBC ECD111217, 2013. 
80  Par 2 of the Employers supporting affidavit, Application for Condonation to the South African 
Local Government Bargaining Council, dated 28 November 2012. 
81  Par 9 of the employee’s opposing affidavit. 
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On 14 November 2012 the employee received a notice to attend a disciplinary 
hearing scheduled to commence in December.  The employee, however, demanded 
that the employer’s conduct was unlawful and demanded that the employer first 
proceed to bring an application for condonation at the SALGBC.  The employer 
heeded the advice of the employee and filed an application for condonation on the 
28th of November 2012, however, not before the employee lodged a referral at the 
SALGBC for an unfair labour practice.  
 
The employee alleged that the employer was, or reasonably should have been, 
aware of his alleged misconduct in 2010, alternatively, should have become aware of 
his alleged misconduct after the employer had Internal Audit and Risk Management 
do an investigation, whose report it received in July 2012.82 
 
In the unreported ruling of Commissioner N Sesani,83 the SALGBC, despite the 
vagueness on the part of the employer by not alleging when it gave Internal Audit 
and Risk Management the instruction to proceed with an investigation, granted the 
employer the condonation it sought and made the following ruling:  
 
“The employer is directed to communicate the new date, time and venue for 
the disciplinary hearing to the respondent within 30 days from the receipt of 
this ruling.” 
 
The employer duly notified the employee on the 25th of March 2013 of its intention to 
proceed with the disciplinary hearing on the 30th of April 2013.  The employer at least 
considered the warning underlying the condonation ruling.  However, such 
consideration was short-lived.  On the 24th of April 2013 the employer notified the 
employee that the disciplinary hearing so set down will be indefinitely postponed.84 
All the while the employee remained on suspension.  
 
By June 2013, the employer had made no effort to reconvene the disciplinary 
hearing, resulting in the employee’s unfair and unlawful suspension to carry on 
indefinitely. 
                                                          
82  Par 11 of employee’s opposing affidavit. 
83  Dated 26 February 2013. 
84  Par 18 of employee’s application to have disciplinary proceedings dismissed. 
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The employee elected to approach the SALGBC once again, this time with an 
application to uplift his unlawful suspension, and have the disciplinary proceedings 
dismissed.85 
 
The employee alleged that the employer made a mockery out of the condonation 
ruling, of which the purpose was that, the disciplinary hearing commence without 
further undue delays.86  The employee continued and claimed that it could not have 
been the intention of the Commissioner to grant condonation, however demand 
speedy resolution from there on; for that to be hollow ruling with little or no effect, and 
claimed that substance should trump form.87 
 
The employee claimed that employer was in breach of the condonation ruling as it 
failed to reconvene timeously the disciplinary hearing as provided for in the ruling, 
this despite the fact that condonation was granted on a previous occasion condoning 
the employer’s dilatory conduct.  As a result the employee sought an order declaring 
that the employer should not be allowed to proceed with the disciplinary hearing 
against him in its totalityn and that his unlawful suspension should be uplifted.88 
 
Commissioner Koorts from the SALGBC applied his mind to the relief that the 
employee was seeking and found that, by granting condonation for the employer in 
the first instance and requesting the employer to institute disciplinary action within a 
30-day period, clearly indicated that the employer should commence with the hearing 
without further undue delay.  Commissioner Koorts held further that it was evident 
that the employer’s intention was mala fide and its intention was to extend and delay 
the suspension of the employee and the protracted disciplinary proceedings even 
further than had already been done, and that such conduct on the part of the 
employer was unfair and unacceptable. 
 
Commissioner Koorts ruled the following:89 
                                                          
85  Application to Uplift Suspension and Set Aside Disciplinary Proceedings, dated 3 June 2013. 
86  Par 22. 
87  Par 25. 
88  Par 36 and 37. 
89  SALGBC Ruling, Commissioner R Koorts, dated 16 July 2013. 
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“The respondent must conclude the disciplinary hearing of the Applicant 
and provide the applicant with the outcome of the disciplinary hearing by 
not later than 15 August 2013. 
 
If the respondent fails to conclude the applicant’s disciplinary hearing and 
provide the applicant with the outcome of the disciplinary hearing before 15 
August 2013 
  
- The disciplinary proceedings instituted by the respondent against the 
applicant are dismissed and the respondent may not proceed with the 
disciplinary proceedings against the applicant based on the same 
alleged misconduct.  
 
- The suspension of the applicant must be uplifted with immediate 
effect.” 
 
In giving his ruling, Commissioner Koorts did not close the door completely on 
the employer’s wish to proceed with further disciplinary action against the 
employee.  Instead, he gave the employer a reasonable opportunity to 
conclude the disciplinary proceedings, and only in the event that the employer 
failed to conclude the hearing and provide an outcome within that period 
would the employer be barred from continuing with disciplinary action in its 
entirety.  He did, however, find that the suspension of the employee was 
unlawful and uplifted it with immediate effect.  
 
It is refreshing to see that employees stand up against their employers and 
fight for their rights of fair labour practices.  Numerous employees elect to ride 
the wave of receiving remuneration whilst not having to lift a finger to earn 
those enormous monthly salaries, all of course at the tax payers’ expense. 
 
The SALGBC Collective agreement is merely looked at as a guideline instead 
of a collective agreement which is valid and binding on the parties.  
 
Another matter where the Commissioner decided to strictly apply the 
provisions of the SALGBC Collective Agreement, is the matter of IMATU obo 
Pakkiri v Ethekwini Municipality (Parks & Culture),90 where Commissioner 
Ndaba held that where an employee was suspended on 21 December 2006, is 
                                                          
90  (2009) JOL 24349 (SALGBC). 
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further suspended indefinitely on 3 April 2007 and was eventually dismissed 
on 11 November 2008 was unfair. The Commissioner emphasised that the 
SALGBC collective agreement envisages a situation that where an employee 
is suspended in order for the employer to conduct an investigation into the 
alleged misconduct of the employee, that the employer will complete his 
investigation and the hearing within the stipulated three month time period. 
Should it not be able to do that, the employer should ensure that the 
employee’s suspension is uplifted.91 The employer was accordingly found 
guilty of an unfair labour practice. 
 
The cases mentioned above are merely a minor percentage of the annual 
unfair suspension cases referred to the SALGBC every year. It is clear that 
there is a very unfavourable trend developing in Local Governent, the trend of 
suspending an employee should they not suit a political party’s agenda. This 
often results in employees being placed on suspension for period exceeding 
two years.  
 
4.3 THE PUBLIC SERVICE  
 
The Public Service Co-Ordinating Bargaining Council (“PSCBC”) first concluded a 
Collective Agreement governing the disciplinary proceedings within the public sector 
in 1999.92  Subsequent to this, amendments were made to the Disciplinary Code and 
any disciplinary action has to be implemented subject to the Disciplinary Code and 
Procedures for the Public Service (“the Public Service Disciplinary Code”).93  
 
The provision in this Public Service Disciplinary Code regulating preventative 
suspension is situated at Clause 7.2 which provides the following:  
 
“7.2 Precautionary Suspension 
  
a) The employer may suspend an employee on full pay or transfer 
the employee if: 
 
                                                          
91  Par 39. 
92  Resolution No 2 of 1999. 
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33 
i) the employee is alleged have committed a serious 
offence; and  
 
ii) the employer believes that the presence of an employee 
at the workplace might jeopardise any investigation into 
the alleged misconduct, or endanger the well-being or 
safety of any person or state property. 
 
b) A suspension of this kind is a precautionary measure that does 
not constitute a judgement, and must be on full pay. 
 
c) If an employee is suspended or transferred as a precautionary 
measure, the employer must hold a disciplinary hearing within a 
month or 60 days, depending on the complexity of the matter 
and the length of the investigation. The chair of the hearing 
must then decide on any further postponement.” 
 
The Public Service Disciplinary Code appears to be clear and precise with its terms 
as the word “must” in clause 7(2)(c) clearly resembles a peremptory provision which 
should not allow an employer discretion.  This provision, if read in its peremptory 
form requires an employer, who has suspended an employee for alleged misconduct, 
to investigate and conduct a disciplinary hearing within a month to 60 days.  
 
However, despite its peremptory nature, the courts have interpreted this clause 
differently and it appears that even the Labour Court is divided on this very issue.  
 
In the matter of Minister of Labour v General Public Service Sectoral Bargaining 
Council,94 the court was faced with a suspension which did not meet the necessary 
requirements as set out in the Public Service Disciplinary Code.  The employee was 
the Assistant Director: Information Technology and was suspended for various 
charges which were serious in nature.  Two years later his suspension was uplifted 
by agreement and he was allowed to resume his duties.  After a period of two months 
back from his previous lengthy suspension, the employee was suspended once 
again, however this time for other allegations consisting of fraud and corruption.  The 
employee then having had enough, referred a dispute to the PSCBC contending that 
his suspension had exceeded the period provided for in the Public Service 
Disciplinary Code, was indefinite and in clear contradiction of what is stipulated in the 
Code.  The employee ultimately argued that his suspension constituted an unfair 
labour practice.  
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As the suspension of the employee did exceed the period stipulated in the Public 
Service Disciplinary Code, that being a period of 60 days, the Arbitrator had to 
interpret the provision and apply it to the facts at hand.  The Arbitrator found that no 
exceptional circumstances were provided by the employer as to why the suspension 
exceeded the 60-day provision and accordingly found the suspension unfair.95 
 
The employer took the arbitrator’s decision on review. Judge Francis interpreted 
clause 7(2)(c) to mean that once an employee was suspended the employer had no 
alternative but to hold a disciplinary hearing within a month or 60 days.  And only if 
the matter is seriously complex does the disciplinary chairperson have discretion to 
postpone the hearing.  A suspension therefore cannot extend beyond 60 days 
without a disciplinary hearing being held in order for the employer to place factors 
before the disciplinary chairperson motivating a postponement and for the 
disciplinary chairperson to exercise his discretion in this regard.96  
 
In considering whether or not the employer committed an unfair labour practice by 
allowing the employee to continue on a protracted suspension,  Judge Francis 
referred to the case of Ngwenya v Premier of Kwazulu Natal.97  Judge Francis 
agreed with Judge Ngcamu’s decision and correctly upheld the arbitrator’s view that 
the employer committed an unfair labour practice by exceeding the period of 60 
days.98 
 
In Ngwenya, the court was faced with a very unusual set of circumstances.  The 
employee was the highest ranking employee in the Department of Works.  He was 
suspended in July 2000 which suspension was a precautionary measure only as he 
was suspended in terms of clause 7.2 of their Disciplinary Code awaiting 
investigation and ultimately a disciplinary hearing.  The employee was not afforded 
any hearing before his precautionary suspension.99 
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The employee was on suspension for approximately 6 months without any indication 
by the employer of a disciplinary hearing.  As the period of 30 days, as stipulated in 
the Public Service Disciplinary Code had lapsed, the employee queried the 
suspension and eventually referred a dispute.100  
 
At the conciliation, a settlement agreement was entered into, the material terms of 
which provided that the employee’s suspension was uplifted and he could resume his 
duties the next day.101  
 
Instead of honourably instituting the settlement agreement which allowed the 
employee to return to work, the Premier suspended the employee again for the exact 
same allegations and circumstances for which he was suspended previously, and 
which unlawful suspension was resolved by means of the settlement agreement.  
Once again, the employee was not given the courtesy of a hearing prior to his 
second suspension.102 
 
The employee was left with no other alternative but to apply for urgent relief to the 
Labour Court to enforce the settlement agreement.  Even though the employer 
argued that the employee should have referred the dispute to the bargaining council, 
Judge Ngcamu sided with the employee and found that the employer’s conduct in 
suspending the employee was not only unfair, but also bordered on fraud with an 
intent to play a merry-go-round with the employee, which would deny the courts their 
aim for justice and a speedy resolution of labour disputes.103  
 
The crux of Ngwenya, specifically relating to the aspect of preventative suspensions, 
is that where a Code provides that when an employee is suspended, a disciplinary 
hearing must be held within a month, it is unfair for an employer not to do so.  An 
employee, who is kept indefinitely on suspension, even if the employee is paid during 
that period of suspension, is unfair.104  This much was confirmed by the Israel 
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Judgment,105 in which it was held that where a Code provides that a disciplinary 
hearing has to be convened within a certain time period there is a positive duty on 
the employer to ensure that it happens within the prescribed time limitations. 
 
The Labour Court appears to be divided on this point of whether an employer may 
still proceed with disciplinary action should it have failed to institute action within the 
60-day period.  As per Ngwenya and Isreal above, the Labour Court appears to say 
no. In terms of that interpretation an employer will be barred from instituting 
disciplinary action after the 60-day period if the suspension was not properly 
extended by a disciplinary chairperson after a proper hearing.  
 
However, another interpretation has arisen in the Labour Courts. This is apparent 
from the Labour Court decision of Mapulane v Madibeng Local Municipality and 
Another.106  Judge Bhoola was faced with an urgent application brought by the 
employee uplifting his suspension and to resume his duties as a section 56 Manager 
of the employer.  The employee was placed on special leave by the employer on 4 
August 2009 which decision was set aside by the Labour Court on 7 August 2009.  
The employee was again suspended on 13 August 2009 after which the employee 
once again brought an application to the Labour Court.  The Labour Court ordered 
that the employee might resume his duties on 25 August 2009.  On 30 October 2009 
the employee was again suspended for the third time, which suspension was 
extended by the employer on 7 December 2009. When the employee wanted to 
resume his duties on 7 January 2010 he was refused access as the employer alleged 
that he was still on suspension.107 
 
Bhoola J had to decide firstly, whether the suspension of the employee ended by 
taking into consideration clause 17.4 of the collective agreement read together with 
clause 16.3 of the employee’s contract of employment, and secondly whether the 
second respondent extended the suspension of the employee and whether it had the 
authority to do so.108 
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The contentious paragraph causing controversy was the following:109  
 
“In the light of the fact that this disciplinary hearing has commenced within 
the 60 day period contemplated in paragraph 17.4 of the employee’s 
contract of employment (Annexure A to this notice), the employee’s 
suspension has not been terminated and the employee is not entitled to 
return for duty as envisaged in the aforementioned paragraph.” 
 
The next issue to be decided by Bhoola J was whether the employee’s suspension 
had lapsed or ended.  The employee’s contract of employment specifically provides 
for preventative suspension.  The employment contract goes one step further and 
stipulates the following at clause 17.4:110 
 
“Furthermore if the employee is suspended as a precautionary measure, 
the employer must hold a disciplinary hearing within sixty (60) days, 
provided that the chairperson of the hearing may extend such period failing 
which the suspension shall terminate and the employee shall return to full 
duty.” 
 
The employee in this matter contended that the rule of interpretation that should be 
applied is the words’ ordinary meaning, and as a result, as the 60-day period is 
peremptory, his suspension was unlawful.111 
 
When faced to decide whether the employer might proceed with the disciplinary 
action despite exceeding the 60-day period, the employer turned to Pillay J’s 
observation in Jonker v Okhahlamba Municipality and Others,112 where she found the 
following:  
 
“… the procedure and time limits are a commitment to deal with the 
discipline expeditiously and they serve as a guide as to how this can be 
accomplished. To hold that the procedure and the time limits are written in 
stone and immutable must necessarily imply that the first respondent 
elected to abandon or waive its wide powers of discipline, which the law 
requires it to exercise in a reasonable manner. Why the first respondent 
would contract away such substantial rights in favour of the applicant is 
unfathomable. The waiver or abandonment by the first respondent cannot 
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112  [2005] 6 BLLR 564 (LC) par 20. 
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necessarily or reasonably be inferred from the contract. Neither the terms 
of the contract nor the conduct of the first respondent’s representatives 
amounts to an unequivocal waiver of the right to discipline the applicant.” 
 
Bhoola J does not specifically deal with the issue about whether an employer can 
continue with disciplinary action despite exceeding the 60 day period.  He, however, 
does find that, should a hearing have commenced, and it is postponed, it suffices that 
a hearing was held and the employer would pass muster in that regard.113 
 
In the matter of Lovejoy Malambo & Another,114 Landman J found that an employer 
who had failed to institute disciplinary action within the stipulated 60-day period might 
be barred from proceeding forthwith with the charges against the employee. 
 
Judge Molahlehi thinks otherwise as becomes clear in Lekabe v Minister, 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development.115  Molahlehi J was also 
faced with yet another aspect of these protracted suspensions pending disciplinary 
action. In this case the employee brought an application in the Labour Court claiming 
that because the employer failed to institute a hearing within the 60-day period as 
provided for the Public Service Disciplinary Code, the employer waives its right to 
discipline the employee and tacitly revoked its right to proceed and that it was barred 
from proceeding with disciplinary action.  Therefore the suspension should be 
revoked. In other words, that the employer’s right to disciplinary action had 
prescribed. 
 
Molahlehi J disagreed with the employee and held that 7(2)(c) dealt with the 
suspension of an employee, not the disciplinary action that followed that 
precautionary suspension, and nothing in that clause indicated that the employer 
would lose its right to discipline should it fail to do so.  At most the employee’s 
suspension fell away unless the chairperson extended that period.116 
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Molahlehi J went further and interpreted the meaning of clause 7(2)(c) to address the 
mischief between parties as stated by van Niekerk J in Mogothle v Member of the 
Executive Council for Agriculture, Conservation & the Environmental & Another (sic), 
where the following was held:117 
 
“…regard suspicion as a legitimate measure of first resort to the most 
groundless suspicion of misconduct, or worst still, to view suspicion as a 
convenient mechanism to marginalise an employee who has fallen from the 
favour.” 
 
The purpose of this section is therefore to address the abuse of employers using 
protracted suspensions as a means to marginalize employees who have fallen out of 
the employers favour and to limit the detrimental impact and prejudice employees 
suffer to their reputation, advancement, job security and fulfilment that are caused by 
these protracted suspensions.118 
 
Despite Molahlehi J not approving of the employee’s interpretation regarding the 
employer’s right to proceed further with disciplinary action, he did find that the 
suspension exceeding the 60-day period was unlawful and should be uplifted as all 
investigations by the employer should have been completed at that stage.119 
 
As seen above, the Labour Courts have had different interpretations with regards to 
the lawfulness of suspensions exceeding the 60-day period as stipulated in Clause 
7(2)(c), and the continuation of a disciplinary hearing following the provision.  
Unfortunately the Supreme Court of Appeal has not yet decided on this very factor.  It 
would be in the interest of justice that it does so shortly, not only for the benefit of 
employee’s, but also for the taxpayers of South Africa who are in fact paying for these 
extended periods of suspension.  
 
I respectfully disagree with the Labour Court’s decision in Mapulane and Lekabe. It 
could not have been the intention of the drafters of the Public Service Disciplinary 
Code that an employer can simply bring about a preliminary hearing, extend the 
employee’s suspension and then not take any positive steps to bring the disciplinary 
                                                          
117  Unreported, J2622/08. 
118  Lekabe, par 21. 
119  Par 21. 
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action to any form of finality.  As there is no other clause in the Public Service 
Disciplinary Code dealing with a restriction in this regard, the door is clearly left open 
for the employer to abuse.  It cannot be said that such conduct is fair under the 
circumstances, and employees are being subjected to unfair treatment.  There have 
been numerous decisions by the Labour Courts setting out the detriment to 
employees, should a disciplinary hearing be held more than 2 years after the event. 
The one obvious detriment is the loss of finer details no longer in your memory, the 
other is the lack of availability of witnesses.  The detrimental impact on employees 
obviously stretches much farther than these two, but for the sake of repetition will not 
be discussed here in any detail.  
 
4.4 THE EFFECT OF PROTRACTED SUSPENSIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA AS 
A WHOLE 
 
It has long been the complaint of citizens of South Africa that they are paying 
exceptional taxes and that such hard earned money is poorly spent by Government. 
 
When Government officials are suspended, months, if not years at a time, such 
conduct can be called nothing short of gross fruitless, wasteful and irregular 
expenditure.  
 
During these extended periods of suspension, during which not only the employee on 
suspension has to be paid his full remuneration as well as other benefits, but another 
individual has to be paid to fulfil the duties which the employee is barred from fulfilling 
until the disciplinary hearing has been finalized and the outcome provided.  The 
expenditure on the State is accordingly usually double for every position subject to 
such suspensions.  
 
More often than not, no reasonable explanation can be given by the State as to why 
an employee is facing extended periods of suspension.  The general explanation is 
that the investigation is not concluded, or alternatively that there are no suitable 
dates available for a meeting between the parties.  The only inference that can be 
drawn under the circumstances is that the majority of these suspensions are 
politically driven hence no logical explanation can be provided.  
41 
 
In 2012 the Public Service Commission (“PCS”),120 whose purpose is to encourage 
and develop an effective public service, conducted research after noticing the large 
number of employees on suspension, the length of the suspension periods and 
probable costs that must be associated with those suspensions.121  What the PCS 
found was astounding. In the financial year 2010/2011 a total number of 1559 
employees in national departments were placed on precautionary suspension.  The 
costs to the State for those employees so suspended amounted to R51.2 million.122 
 
This very sore point was perfectly captured by Judge Ngcamu AJA in the matter of 
Ngwenya in which he stated the following:123 
 
“An employee cannot remain on suspension, which is a precautionary 
measure, for an indefinite period of time and the State gladly pays the 
employee for doing nothing. I am surprised that the State is willing and able 
to pay people for doing nothing when it does not have money to pay those 
performing their duties. If the suspension remains indefinitely and without 
legitimate reason, the employee is entitled to approach the court for the 
upliftment of the suspension and order the State to allow the employee to 
resume his duties until such time that the enquiry is held. In my view, that is 
not only in the interests of the employee but also in the public interest.” 
 
It is time that the South African Government stands up to this abuse of power, and 
political officials abusing the process to aid their own political agenda, to the expense 
of employees who have fallen out of favour.  The only method to curb these 
unacceptable practices will be the introduction of personal liability of corrupt officials 
and their political agendas. 
  
4.5 THE VALIDITY OF “SPECIAL LEAVE” 
 
For years Local Government has been suspending employees under the guise of 
granting them “special leave”, either pending a disciplinary hearing or for punitive 
reasons.  
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However, in the recent judgement of Heynecke v Umhlatuze Municipality,124 Judge 
Pillay drew a line in the sand.  The employee was the Municipal Manager who was 
approached by the Chief Whip instructing him to go on a period of special leave, to 
which the employee agreed, provided that the special leave is for a short period. 
After a highly conflicting council meeting, a resolution was passed.  The employee 
was not charged immediately, and it was resolutely held by the Council that the 
special leave had nothing to do with the charges against him. 
 
The employee alleged that the special leave was unlawful because the Municipality 
was abusing the special leave as if it were a preventative suspension, and that it was 
in breach of his conditions of employment.  The Labour Court had to determine 
whether the special leave which was imposed on the employee was lawful.125 
  
Special leave is provided for in Regulation 15 of the Local Government Municipal 
Performance Regulations for Municipal Managers and Managers Directly 
Accountable to Municipal Managers, 2006. It provides as follows:  
 
“The employer may grant the employee special leave with or without pay 
for a reasonable number of days with approval in terms of the relevant 
special leave policy of the municipality.” 
 
The words “with approval” clearly indicate that special leave is a privilege which can 
be granted at the request of the employee, not to be imposed upon by the employer. 
What is further important to note is that the drafters clearly meant this special leave 
to be for a very limited duration of time in that it provides for a “reasonable number of 
days”, not a period of time and especially not an extended period of time.126 
 
The Municipality’s Policy on special leave provides the following at clause 12.5: 
 
“Special leave may be granted to an employee under exceptional 
circumstances for any purposes not provided for in this policy and for such 
period and such conditions as the council may prescribe by resolution.” 
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It is therefore clear that the council had the authority to prescribe the conditions of the 
special leave but not the special leave itself.127  Judge Pillay interpreted the 
exceptional circumstances under which a council may approve special leave to be for 
the benefit of the employee and the circumstances have to be exceptional.128 
 
In the event that special leave is imposed by the Municipality on an employee, the 
only inference that can be drawn is that the employer is imposing a suspension under 
the guise of special leave in order to avoid the employee referring an unfair labour 
practice to the relevant Bargaining Council, as provided for by the LRA.129  In order 
for the Municipality to prove that the special leave was fair and lawful it had to show 
that the special leave was not imposed on the employee, was at all times at the 
insistence of the employee, with his consent and that exceptional circumstances 
existed, that it was rational, reasonable and in the public interest.130  It is clear that 
the onus on the employer is a very stringent one.  
 
The court weighed up the various reasons provided by the employer for the reasons 
the employee was put on special leave and found that the council failed to apply its 
mind and that the special leave was imposed in bad faith and with an ulterior motive. 
Despite the employer’s allegations that placing the employee on special leave had 
nothing to do with the charges of alleged misconduct which ensued months later, it 
was found by the court not to hold water,131 and that the evidence before it 
established beyond a doubt a link between placing the employee on special leave, 
the investigation and the charges.132 
 
Not only are the employee’s rights and reputation being adversely affected, but a 
Municipality’s conduct in such circumstances detrimentally affects the public at large 
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and amounts to an unacceptable waste of the taxpayer’s money and the resources of 
the State. In this regard the Court noted the following:133  
 
“No municipality, acting reasonably, in the public interest, can put an 
employee on special leave on full pay for a long time, not even if such 
employee agrees. Such an agreement is against public interest and public 
policy, for it can never be public policy to waste resources. Paying for 
services that are not rendered is wasteful.” 
 
Judge Pillay agrees that this practice of protracted suspensions is a sign of weak 
procedures and shows that management is incapable of diagnosing problems and 
find efficient solutions within the 60 days that are provided in the collective 
agreement. He is quite adamant that such practice cannot continue.134 
 
On the grounds mentioned above, together with various others that were not 
applicable for this paper the court found that the special leave was unlawful as the 
employee’s contract, read with legislation and policy on special leave, did not allow 
for the employer to impose leave on the employee.135  
 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
 
It is clear that, despite the existence of a disciplinary code or collective agreement 
that governs the employment relationship in the public sector or municipalities, 
generally the heads of the Government divisions do not take these codes into 
consideration, but alternatively, purposefully ignore them to aid and forward their own 
political agenda.  
 
Unfortunately, the political agendas in the local municipalities are rife and the effect 
on the community and the consequences that follow in general are severe and far-
reaching.  The wastage of funds that are used to aid these politically driven agendas 
are unacceptable and become apparent in the maladministration of these entities. 
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The disciplinary codes and collective agreements are there for a purpose, to protect 
both the employer and the employee.  
 
State organs need to shape up and follow these codes; they are not mere guidelines 
to be ignored at whim, they are peremptory rules that create the cornerstone of the 
relationship between the employer and the employee.  
 
The State should take note of Mabilo136 in which Jajbhay AJ correctly captured the 
criteria for judging the fairness of a suspension pending disciplinary action, that 
where the integrity and morale of the employer require that action be taken without 
undue delay.  In the event that a preventative suspension is necessary for orderly 
administration, the rights of the employee still have to be considered, and the 
employee has the right to a speedy and effective resolution of the dispute.  In the 
event that the employer fails to finalize the process timeously it will be considered an 
abuse of the process.137  
 
Employers further have to avoid protracted preventative suspensions in that it could 
be seen as having a disciplinary effect, preventing an employer from imposing a 
sanction after a disciplinary hearing.  This principle was confirmed in CEIWU obo 
Khumalo v SHM Engineering CC.138  It was held in this matter that where a 
suspension is unreasonably long, especially without pay, an employee can be 
unfairly prejudiced and result in a punitive effect in itself.  
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CHAPTER 5 
FORUMS AND RELIEF 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Suspension is commonly used by employers against employees in an unlawful 
manner and often, to the severe detriment of the employee.  As indicated in previous 
chapters, suspension could have severe adverse effects on employees which range 
from damage to reputation to economic hardships.  
 
If the employee feels aggrieved regarding the substantive or procedural aspects of 
his suspension, the employee is not remediless.  
 
In this chapter I shall be addressing where and how employees can vent their 
grievances when faced with such potentially unfair suspensions. 
 
5.2 COMMISSION FOR CONCILIATION, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION 
 
An unfair suspension constitutes an unfair labour practice in terms of section 186(2) 
of the LRA.139  Therefore, the employee is entitled to refer a dispute to the CCMA or 
the applicable Bargaining Council for conciliation and arbitration within the stipulated 
time period as set out in section 191(1) of the LRA. 
 
The most appropriate way to establish properly the lawfulness and fairness of a 
suspension would be by means of a referral to the CCMA or bargaining council for 
conciliation or arbitration.  A declaration of unlawfulness will not be appropriate in 
motion court proceedings and often better accomplished at arbitration.  However, 
should compelling circumstances exist and should the suspension carry a reasonably 
apprehension of irreparable harm for the employee, the appropriate remedy could 
only be an order for urgent interim relief pending the outcome of the unfair labour 
practice proceedings in the CCMA or Bargaining Council.140 
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5.3 THE LABOUR COURT 
 
5.3.1 URGENT INTERDICT 
 
The Labour Court has the power to grant urgent interdictory relief in terms of the 
Labour Court Rules.141  However, it will not do so without acceptable motive, and in 
order for an applicant to be afforded urgent interdictory relief, the applicant will have 
to prove and overcome various elements:  
 
The first hurdle which an applicant will have to prove is that of urgency. An applicant 
cannot merely allege urgency without substantiating its allegations.  
 
What constitutes urgency in an application is not specifically set out in the Labour 
Court Rules, and it is therefore accepted that the grounds of urgency as set out the 
Rules of the High Court would be applicable.  
 
These grounds of urgency can be summarized as follows:  
 
“a) either a clear right or the right which is, although open to some doubt, 
prima facie established, is being infringed (or that the threat of such 
infringement exists); 
 
b) there is a well-grounded apprehension that the applicant will suffer 
irreparable harm if the urgent relief is not granted; 
 
c) the applicant has no other satisfactory remedy; and 
 
d) the balance of convenience favours the applicant.” 
 
Grounds of urgency are best described by Kroon J in the case of Caledon Street 
Restaurant CC v D’Alveira,142 in which he noted the following: 
 
“The applicant, or more accurately, his legal advisors, must carefully 
analyse the facts of each case to determine whether the greater or lesser 
degree of relaxation of the Rules and the ordinary practice of the Court is 
merited and must in all respects responsibly strike a balance between the 
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duty to obey Rule 6(5)(a) and the entitlement to deviate therefrom, bearing 
in mind that that entitlement and the extent thereof are dependent upon and 
are thus limited by the urgency which prevails. The degree of relaxation of 
the Rules should not be greater than the exigencies of the case demand 
and it need hardly be added these exigencies must appear from the 
papers.” 
 
Kroon J went on further and stated, on a more practical level:  
 
“[i]t will follow that there must be a marked degree of urgency before it is 
justifiable not use form 2A. It may be that the time elements involved or 
other circumstances justify dispensing with all prior notice the respondent. 
In such a case form 2 will suffice, subject to that exception it appears that 
all requirements of urgency can be met by using form 2A with shortened 
time periods, or by another adaptation of the form for example advance 
nomination of a date for the hearing of the matter, or omitting notice to the 
Registrar accompanied by changed wording where necessary. Adjustments 
not abandonment of form 2A is the method.” 
 
Therefore, unless an applicant can prove that the relief sought is genuinely urgent, it 
would be safer to apply in ordinary course of events and give regular notice as set 
out of the Labour Court Rules.  
 
According to Tlaletsi JA in the Labour Appeal Court, the Labour Court may in the 
exercise of the powers provided in section 158(1) interdict any conduct by the 
employer that is found to be unfair, and that includes disciplinary action.143  Tlaletsi 
JA warned that such decisions are not mandatory, the Judge has a discretion and 
each matter has a different set of facts.  Furthermore, the list of factors that would 
contribute to whether or not a Judge should intervene are not exhaustive, but 
primarily one would look at whether the failure to intervene would lead to a grave 
injustice and whether justice could be attained by other means, for example a referral 
to the CCMA or Bargaining Council.144 
 
The Labour Court has refused to intervene in disciplinary proceedings either because 
the applicants were not able to satisfy the requirement of a prima facie right, or the 
facts of the matter simply did not give rise to the “exceptional circumstances” in which 
the Labour Court could intervene. 
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Courts are often reluctant to intervene in disciplinary proceedings, which would 
include those of unfair precautionary suspensions.  The reason for this reluctance 
being that it is generally undesirable for the Labour Court to intervene in uncompleted 
proceedings.  If the Labour Court, on a regular basis, intervened in disciplinary 
proceedings, it would effectively undermine the statutory dispute-resolution system 
and eventually lead to the complete frustration of the point of quick and speedy 
resolution of labour disputes.145  Employees should therefore carefully consider 
before approaching the courts if they have other remedies available to them. 
   
One of the main aspects that affect an employee to the extent to approach the 
courts, and which goes to the heart of the employment relationship, is that of 
remuneration.  The withholding of remuneration during a preventative suspension, 
one would assume, would warrant sufficient grounds for an urgent interdict where an 
applicant could apply for an urgent mandamus to prevent the employer from 
continuing with its unlawful conduct.  A suspension without pay constitutes a breach 
of contract and can cause severe economic hardships to an employee who is 
suddenly stranded without an income.  However, up until a few years ago the Labour 
Courts did not consider the mere loss of income sufficient for “urgent relief”.146  
 
In Veary, the only ground of urgency raised by the Applicant was the loss of income, 
and Judge Pillay found that this in itself was not a sufficient ground of urgency.  
Judge Pillay went further to say that he could challenge his unfair suspension as an 
unfair labour practice and therefore had a sufficient alternative remedy. 
 
The court will not grant urgent interdictory relief for loss of reputation or stigmatization 
as these are general factors which distinguish an employee’s case of suspension 
from any other disciplinary conduct such as dismissal.147  However, in severe cases 
the judges have been inclined to consider urgent relief.  This is clear from the case of 
Muller v Chairman, Minister’s Council: House of Representatives148 in which Judge 
                                                          
145  Jiba v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & Others (2009) JOL 23716 (LAC) 
par 11. 
146  Veary v Provincial Commissioner of Police [2003] 1 BLLR 96 (LC). 
147  Thompson “Interdicting Suspension and the Disciplinary Enquiry: The role of the Labour Court” 
(2012). 
148  (1992) (2) SA 508 (CP) at 523 (B). 
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Howie stated that the implications of being deprived of one’s remuneration are often 
very obvious.  One is being refused entry to work to pursue the career one chose, 
that refusal is clear to one’s peers and the rest of the community and that respect is 
often not protected and often underestimated in other cases. 
 
Over the years one notes a change in the court’s interpretation of the above 
provisions. In 2008 in the matter of Harley v Bacarac Trading 39 (Pty) Ltd,149 Judge 
Van Niekerk held that when an employer has withheld an employee’s remuneration 
during the course of a preventative suspension, that it is unlawful, and that an 
employee was entitled to seek the court’s relief on an urgent basis. 
 
The withholding of remuneration is not the only ground on which an employee can 
rely in order to succeed with an urgent interdict.  An employee is entitled to urgent 
interdictory relief where he has not been given a proper opportunity to be heard 
before being suspended or when the suspension of the employee is blatantly not 
substantively fair.  The fairness of a suspension is set out in Chapter 3 above, 
however, employees are warned that the substantive fairness of a suspension is 
often not easily established through motion court proceedings and a referral to the 
CCMA or Bargaining Council might be more suited. 
 
5.3.2 BREACH OF CONTRACT  
 
By withholding remuneration during preventative suspension, the employer is acting 
unlawfully and is, amongst other things, committing a breach of contract.150  In such 
circumstances an employee will act completely within his rights to approach the 
Labour Court in order to sue the employer for damages suffered as a result of breach 
of contract by the employer and the employer’s unlawful conduct.151  The employee 
can also approach the Labour Court for urgent relief as discussed in 5.2.1 above. 
 
It has to be noted however that every matter is different and has to be decided on its 
own merits and the terms of the contract of employment will determine whether 
                                                          
149  [2009] 6 BLLR 534 (LC). 
150  Thompson “Interdicting Suspension and the Disciplinary Enquiry: The role of the Labour Court”. 
151  Harley v Bacarac Trading 39 (Pty) Ltd [2009] 6 BLLR 534 (LC).  
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withholding remuneration during preventative suspension amounts to breach of 
contract.  
 
5.4 HIGH COURT 
 
As indicated in paragraph 5.2.2, an employee can approach the Labour Court to sue 
an employer for breach of contract in the event that the employer withholds the 
remuneration to which an employee is entitled to.  However, this form of relief can 
also be sought from the High Court.  
 
The High Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Labour Court in relation to any 
violation relating to employment and emanating from labour relations.152  More 
specifically, Nugent JA has confirmed that an employee’s claim, relating to the 
enforcement of an employment contract, can be adjudicated successfully in the High 
Court and employees are not bound to the Labour Court in this regard.153 
 
This view was also confirmed by the Labour Court in the recent judgment of SAMWU 
obo Mathabela v Dr JS Moroka Local Municipality,154 where it was held that there are 
major difficulties associated with the challenges that employees face when they are 
associated with disciplinary proceedings and suspensions through the mechanisms  
which have been provided by the LRA and therefore it appears to be appropriate and 
more convenient to take on employers on the grounds of unlawfulness in terms of the 
contract of employment which will be done in the High Court, rather than the principle 
of fairness in the Labour Court.  
 
5.5 ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY 
 
Apart from the unfair labour practice route and the urgent interdictory route, public 
servant employees have attempted to declare a suspension by Government an 
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administrative act and wanted to rely on remedies afforded in Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act,155 rather the remedies mentioned above.  
 
However, these attempts were finally put to bed in the matter of SAPU & Another v 
National Commissioner of the South African Police Service & Another,156 where it 
was held that suspension is an employment or labour-relations matter and does not 
amount to an administrative act purely because the employer is part of a tier of 
Government.  
 
This concept was confirmed by the Constitutional Court.  As a result of Constitutional 
Court cases like Fredericks157 and Chirwa,158 together with other preceding 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Appeal as well as other courts, the concept of 
what constitutes administrative action resulted in various differences in opinion and 
the Constitutional Court elected to provide clarity as to the disputes between public 
sector employees and their employers.159  In Gcaba the question before the court 
was whether the decision not to appoint Mr Gcaba constituted administrative action 
and thus was subject to administrative review (in the High Court) or whether Mr 
Gcaba should have followed the procedures provided for in the LRA. In considering 
this question, the Constitutional Court turned to Fredericks and Chirwa in an attempt 
to see whether the judgments could be reconciled.  In Chirwa it was held that the 
decision to terminate Chirwa’s services did not amount to administrative action and 
consequently that the High Court did not have jurisdiction to determine the dispute. In 
Fredericks the applicants complained of a violation of their rights to equality and just 
administrative action arising out of the failure to consider their applications for 
voluntary retrenchment. Important to note that in Fredericks, the applicants did not 
complain about their violation of their right to fair labour practices or any rights under 
the LRA.  The Constitutional Court in Gcaba held that Fredericks and Chirwa is 
distinguishable on the basis of how their respective cases were pleaded.160  The 
court effectively held that the consequence of the finding that the conduct behind 
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employment grievances is not administrative action and that it substantially reduces 
the problems associated with parallel systems of law, and that if possible, the 
appropriate mechanisms in dealing with such disputes are those provided for by the 
LRA.161  Chirwa’s view was accordingly consolidated in Gcaba. 
 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
 
Employees, when faced with an unfair suspension must refer an unfair labour 
practice dispute to the CCMA or the appropriate Bargaining Council.  This, however, 
does not mean that, where an employee is faced with imminent harm relating to their 
suspension, that he/she must wait out the time periods that often accompany a 
referral to the forums mentioned above, (which often can be up to 3 months for an 
arbitration date).  When faced with urgent circumstances, for example the unlawful 
withholding of an employee’s remuneration during a preventative suspension, the 
employee has every right to approach the Labour Court (or the High Court in certain 
circumstances) on an urgent basis and seek an urgent interdict or declaratory order. 
However, employees must be able to prove urgency in the ordinary course of events 
and employees should not approach the courts should they have alternative 
remedies to which they could, and maybe should, have turned to.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
During the past largely antagonistic relationship between employer and employee, 
the employee more often than not, suffered at the hands of the employer.  However, 
with the introduction of new labour legislation and recent case law, the employee is 
increasingly protected.  Employers are motivated to implement disciplinary codes 
which will govern the employment relationship and are effectively better for 
employers and employees.  Such disciplinary codes aim to motivate employers to 
comply with disciplinary measures such as preventative and punitive suspensions 
both procedurally and substantively.  
 
Both punitive and preventative suspensions are largely governed by either contracts 
of employment, disciplinary codes or collective agreements.  It is very seldom, 
however, that these documents set out rules that govern the procedural as well as 
substantive aspects of such a suspension which often lead to none being followed 
and employees being left vulnerable and aggrieved by the employer’s conduct.  
 
It is a pity that our legislation does not summarize these procedural and substantive 
requirements for suspension in our labour legislation in any particular details like 
section 189 summarizes procedural and substantive requirements for retrenchments.  
This lack of conformity leads to abuse and negligence by employers, to the detriment 
of employees.  This, however, does not indicate that the LRA does not provide any 
form of guidance in regard to the aspect of suspension.  The procedural and 
substantive fairness requirements as provided Code of Good Practice Dismissal 
should apply and be used as a guideline, taking into account that suspension is an 
alternative to dismissal. 
 
Throughout this script I merely skimmed the surface of a number of suspension-
related cases that are referred to the labour forums and courts, which clearly indicate 
that suspension is a major concern in our employment society.  
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In the public and local government sectors with the State as the employer, 
preventative suspensions are being abused to suit the agenda of the employer, 
which are often political agendas, to the severe detriment of the employees.  This 
has led to major abuse of public funds paid by the taxpayer, a practice which has to 
stop.  The only way in which this practice will stop is when the State implements a 
personal liability policy for those managers or ministers who abuse this aspect of 
employment law.   
 
It is anticipated that, should the requirements for a fair suspension be legislated like 
section 189, it will lead to more employers being aware of its requirements and 
promote compliance with the requirements. 
 
The substantial social and personal implications that relate to a suspension are 
numerous and far-reaching.  Most employees are prejudiced, not only 
psychologically, but the stigma attached to a suspension also casts a dim light on 
possible future employment prospects.  It is therefore against this background that 
suspension must be preceded by a fair process. 
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